BRICS

1. Origins, expansion and institutional character

The term BRIC originated in a 2001 investment-research paper by economist Jim O’Neill, identifying Brazil, Russia, India and China as economies likely to gain global weight. Diplomatic cooperation began with a foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. The 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit institutionalised leaders-level interaction, while South Africa’s entry added an African voice and produced the BRICS acronym.

Expansion has transformed the grouping’s geographical and political reach. At Johannesburg in August 2023, leaders invited Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join. Argentina subsequently declined. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE entered in January 2024, and Indonesia became a full member in January 2025, bringing confirmed membership to ten at that point. Saudi Arabia’s accession has been described inconsistently in public statements; an invitation should not automatically be treated as completed membership.

BRICS is a coordination forum rather than a supranational organisation. Annual summits, ministerial meetings, working groups and a rotating presidency sustain cooperation across political-security, economic-financial and people-to-people tracks. Decisions rest on consensus and political commitments are generally non-binding. The 2024 Kazan Summit also established a partner-country category, distinct from full membership. BRICS outreach arrangements similarly allow engagement with non-members without conferring membership rights.

• Do not confuse BRICS membership with membership of the New Development Bank: the latter is open to other eligible countries.
• Use date-specific membership and economic data because expansion, exchange rates and measurement methods change aggregate figures.

2. Reforming global governance

BRICS reflects dissatisfaction with institutions whose decision-making structures have not fully adjusted to the growing weight of developing economies. Its members seek stronger emerging-market representation in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, including quota and voice reforms. They also support a central role for the United Nations and reform of the multilateral system. However, common language on reform does not imply agreement on every institutional redesign, particularly specific claims to permanent UN Security Council membership.

In trade, the grouping broadly supports a rules-based multilateral trading system centred on the World Trade Organization and calls for development-sensitive reforms. Food security, energy security, technology access, public health and climate finance increasingly shape its agenda. Developing countries’ concerns over unilateral restrictions and unequal access to finance receive greater visibility through BRICS, although members differ on how directly to challenge Western policies.

The enlarged grouping brings together major energy producers, large consumer markets, manufacturing centres and countries with substantial development needs. Its importance is therefore economic as well as diplomatic. Nevertheless, collective GDP should be interpreted carefully: purchasing-power-parity estimates measure domestic purchasing capacity, whereas market-exchange-rate GDP better reflects many international financial transactions. Neither measure alone establishes geopolitical cohesion. BRICS is best understood as a platform for negotiated issue-based cooperation, not a unified anti-Western bloc.

• GS-II linkage: international institutions, representation, multilateralism and the interests of developing countries.
• Analytical distinction: multipolarity concerns the distribution of power; multilateralism concerns cooperation through shared institutions and rules.

3. Development finance and monetary cooperation

The most tangible institutional outcome is the New Development Bank, created through an agreement signed at Fortaleza in July 2014 and operational from 2015. It finances infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in BRICS and other emerging-market and developing countries. Its authorised capital was set at US$100 billion, with initial subscribed capital of US$50 billion shared equally by the five founding members. Equal founding subscriptions distinguished it from institutions where a single advanced economy holds dominant influence.

The NDB can support transport, water, renewable energy, urban development and other public infrastructure. It also seeks to expand local-currency financing, potentially reducing borrowers’ exposure to currency mismatches. However, project selection, debt sustainability, environmental safeguards and the ability to raise affordable funds remain decisive. The bank complements existing development lenders rather than replacing them; Bangladesh’s entry into the NDB illustrates that bank membership extends beyond BRICS membership.

The Contingent Reserve Arrangement was also established in 2014, with committed resources of US$100 billion. It is intended to address short-term balance-of-payments pressures, not to finance roads or power plants. China committed US$41 billion; Brazil, Russia and India US$18 billion each; and South Africa US$5 billion. Access beyond the limited IMF-delinked portion is tied to an IMF-supported arrangement, qualifying claims that it constitutes a fully independent alternative.

Discussion of local-currency trade and cross-border payments should be separated from proposals for a common currency. BRICS has no shared central bank, common monetary policy or operational common currency. Trade imbalances, limited currency convertibility, liquidity constraints and differing regulations complicate monetary cooperation.

4. Significance for India

BRICS supports India’s strategic autonomy by providing an additional diplomatic platform alongside the G20, United Nations, Quad and other partnerships. Participation demonstrates that engagement with Western partners does not require abandoning cooperation with Russia, China or the wider developing world. India can use the grouping to promote reformed multilateralism while resisting attempts to frame world politics as a rigid choice between rival camps.

Economically, India benefits from development-finance opportunities and engagement with important energy suppliers and emerging markets. NDB-supported investments can contribute to infrastructure and sustainable development. Expansion strengthens interaction with West Asia and Africa, where India has substantial commercial, energy and diaspora interests. Cooperation on resilient supply chains, public health, digital public infrastructure and skills can translate summit diplomacy into practical developmental gains.

India also faces a balancing challenge. China’s economic size and its difficult relationship with India can constrain trust and agenda-setting. Russia’s confrontation with Western countries and Iran’s sanctions exposure may generate pressure for positions that do not fully align with Indian preferences. India should therefore support transparent accession principles, preserve consensus and emphasise sovereignty, territorial integrity, international law and development outcomes rather than bloc confrontation.

• Opportunity: amplify Global South priorities without surrendering issue-based flexibility.
• Priority: connect BRICS initiatives with India’s infrastructure, energy-transition and technology objectives.
• Caution: engagement within BRICS does not resolve bilateral disputes or eliminate differences over security.

5. Constraints and the way forward

BRICS combines different political systems, economic structures and security alignments. India–China tensions, competition among regional powers and divergent relationships with the United States limit collective action. Expansion increases representativeness but also raises the number of interests requiring accommodation. Consensus prevents domination through formal voting, yet can produce diluted declarations or slow implementation.

Institutional capacity is another limitation. An extensive calendar of meetings does not guarantee delivery, and BRICS itself has no central enforcement mechanism. Financial initiatives face real-world constraints from credit ratings, sanctions risk, global capital markets and investor confidence. The NDB’s decision in March 2022 to put new transactions in Russia on hold demonstrates that multilateral financial operations cannot be insulated completely from geopolitical shocks.

A pragmatic agenda should prioritise measurable cooperation: viable infrastructure projects, health research, disaster resilience, agricultural knowledge, interoperable payment arrangements and transparent development finance. Greater project disclosure and regular implementation reviews would improve credibility. For India, the preferable approach is reform rather than indiscriminate replacement of existing institutions. BRICS will be most useful when it broadens developing-country choice and strengthens rules-based cooperation, not when symbolic confrontation displaces practical problem-solving.

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