Freedom of religion

1. Constitutional foundations and Indian secularism

The Preamble promises liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Articles 25–28 translate this commitment into enforceable fundamental rights. They operate alongside equality before law under Article 14, the prohibition of specified discrimination under Article 15, freedom of expression under Article 19 and protection of life and personal liberty under Article 21. Article 17’s abolition of untouchability places another important limit on discriminatory practices defended in religious terms.

Indian secularism permits State engagement with religious institutions where constitutionally justified. The State may regulate secular activities associated with religion, enact social reform and protect individuals against exclusion. However, government cannot abandon equal citizenship or identify itself constitutionally with one religion. In S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994, the Supreme Court affirmed secularism as part of the Constitution’s basic structure.

Religious freedom includes the freedom to believe, change belief or decline religious participation. Protection is not confined to organised faiths or majority traditions. Articles 32 and 226 provide routes for judicial enforcement. Fundamental duties complement this framework: Article 51A(e) calls for harmony and common brotherhood transcending religious diversities. Duties guide civic conduct but do not independently authorise restrictions on fundamental rights.

• Exam distinction: India was constitutionally secular before ‘secular’ was expressly added to the Preamble.
• Religious freedom protects conscience as well as outward religious conduct; neither is synonymous with an unrestricted exemption from general law.

2. Article 25: conscience, profession, practice and propagation

Article 25(1) gives all persons equal entitlement to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Conscience concerns inner conviction; profession concerns openly declaring faith; practice covers religious observances; propagation concerns communicating or explaining religious beliefs. These rights are expressly subject to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III.

Article 25(2)(a) allows laws regulating or restricting economic, financial, political or other secular activities associated with religious practice. Thus, a religious connection does not automatically immunise property management, financial transactions or commercial activities from regulation. Article 25(2)(b) permits laws for social welfare and reform and for throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Explanation I declares that wearing and carrying kirpans is included in the profession of the Sikh religion. Explanation II provides that, specifically for Article 25(2)(b), references to Hindus include persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and references to Hindu religious institutions are construed accordingly. This limited constitutional explanation should not be generalised into a claim that these religions lack separate identities.

In Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977, the Supreme Court upheld the challenged Madhya Pradesh and Orissa laws prohibiting conversion through force, fraud or inducement. It distinguished propagation from a fundamental right to convert another person. This does not mean that voluntary changes of faith are generally prohibited. The wording and constitutional validity of particular State conversion laws must be examined separately.

3. Article 26: religious denominations and institutional autonomy

Article 26 protects every religious denomination or section thereof, subject to public order, morality and health. It guarantees four rights: to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; manage its own affairs in matters of religion; own and acquire movable and immovable property; and administer such property in accordance with law. It therefore concerns collective religious autonomy rather than only individual observance.

In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954, the Supreme Court explained the distinction between religious affairs and secular administration. The judgment associated a religious denomination with common faith, common organisation and a distinctive name. Whether a particular group qualifies depends on its characteristics, not merely its assertion of denominational status.

The essential religious practices doctrine developed through judicial interpretation, with Shirur Mutt as a foundational decision. Courts have examined whether a claimed practice is integral to a religion when deciding constitutional protection. However, this doctrine is not written into Articles 25–26, and its scope remains contested. A careful answer should separately identify the claimed religious character, applicable constitutional restrictions, equality concerns and whether the disputed activity is actually secular administration.

• Managing religious affairs under Article 26(b) differs from administering property under Article 26(d), which expressly operates ‘in accordance with law’.
• The State may regulate secular administration, but regulation cannot automatically justify extinguishing protected denominational autonomy.

4. Articles 27 and 28: public finance and educational institutions

Article 27 protects a person from being compelled to pay taxes whose proceeds are specifically appropriated for expenses promoting or maintaining a particular religion or religious denomination. The key elements are compulsory taxation, specific appropriation and support for a particular religion. It is not a blanket prohibition on expenditure involving religious sites: heritage conservation, crowd safety or neutral public services require a different constitutional assessment.

A regulatory fee is conceptually different from a tax. Charges connected with lawful administration or regulation of religious institutions are not automatically barred by Article 27. Nevertheless, the label attached to a levy is not decisive; its legal character and purpose matter.

Article 28(1) prohibits religious instruction in educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds. Article 28(2) creates an exception for an institution administered by the State but established under an endowment or trust requiring religious instruction. State administration and establishment through such an endowment are therefore both relevant.

Under Article 28(3), a person attending a State-recognised or State-aided educational institution cannot be required to participate in religious instruction or attend religious worship without consent; for a minor, the guardian’s consent is necessary. Mere recognition or receipt of aid does not create the same absolute prohibition as wholly State-funded maintenance. In Aruna Roy v. Union of India, 2002, the Supreme Court distinguished religious instruction from academic study of religions and their philosophies.

5. Applying the framework in examinations

Religious-freedom questions frequently turn on precise qualifiers rather than broad statements about secularism. First identify the rights-holder: an individual under Article 25 or a denomination under Article 26. Next identify whether the dispute concerns belief, religious conduct, property administration, taxation or education. Finally, apply the restriction or institutional category stated in the relevant article rather than importing a general rule.

A balanced constitutional approach neither treats every asserted religious practice as immune from regulation nor assumes that reform permits unlimited State intervention. Public-order restrictions require a genuine justification; minority beliefs need not conform to majority preferences. Conversely, invoking religion cannot by itself defeat laws addressing secular activities or constitutionally authorised social reform.

• Do not confuse Article 25’s propagation right with an unrestricted right to convert another person.
• Do not replace ‘all persons’ with ‘citizens only’.
• Do not treat all State-aided institutions as institutions wholly maintained by State funds.
• Do not assume that every religiously connected expenditure violates Article 27.

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