Legislative relations

1. Constitutional structure and territorial jurisdiction

Legislative federalism divides law-making authority between constitutionally established governments. Unlike a system in which regional powers are merely delegated, Indian States derive their legislative authority directly from the Constitution. Nevertheless, the distribution favours the Union where national coordination, emergencies or overlapping jurisdictions require a decisive authority. Articles 245–255 constitute Chapter I of Part XI, while the Seventh Schedule specifies legislative subjects.

Article 245 allows Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of India and a State legislature to make laws for the whole or any part of that State, subject to the Constitution. Parliamentary legislation cannot be invalidated merely because it has extra-territorial operation. This does not confer unrestricted authority to legislate about entirely unrelated foreign matters: in GVK Industries v. Income Tax Officer (2011), the Supreme Court emphasised a connection with India.

A State law may affect persons, property or transactions outside its boundaries if a sufficient territorial nexus exists with the State. The connection must be real rather than illusory. Territorial jurisdiction must therefore be distinguished from subject-matter competence: a legislature needs constitutional authority over both the subject and the territorial connection of its law.

• Article 245 concerns territorial extent; Article 246 primarily concerns subject-matter distribution.
• Under Article 246(4), Parliament may legislate on any subject for a territory not included in a State, notwithstanding its inclusion in the State List.
• Legislative competence remains subject to Fundamental Rights and other constitutional limitations.

2. The three lists, residuary powers and GST

The Union List covers subjects of national significance, such as defence, foreign affairs, currency, citizenship and railways. The State List includes public order, police, public health, agriculture and local government. The Concurrent List permits both Parliament and State legislatures to legislate on matters such as criminal law, marriage and divorce, forests, education and labour welfare. These examples must be read with the precise wording and qualifications of individual entries.

Article 246 establishes Union predominance when legislative fields genuinely overlap, but courts first attempt to reconcile entries rather than erase State authority. Legislative entries are fields of power and receive a broad interpretation. Taxation entries require particular care: authority over a general regulatory subject does not automatically include authority to impose every related tax.

Article 248 and Union List Entry 97 give Parliament exclusive power over matters not enumerated in the State or Concurrent Lists, including unenumerated taxes, subject to Article 246A. The Forty-second Amendment, 1976 transferred five subjects from the State List to the Concurrent List: education, forests, protection of wild animals and birds, weights and measures, and administration of justice including organisation of courts other than the Supreme Court and High Courts.

The One Hundred and First Amendment, 2016 inserted Article 246A. It grants Parliament and State legislatures power over GST, notwithstanding Articles 246 and 254, while reserving inter-State GST exclusively to Parliament. In Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022), the Supreme Court held that GST Council recommendations are not binding on the Union and States, highlighting cooperative federalism and the distinctive GST architecture.

• Public order and police remain State subjects; criminal law and criminal procedure are Concurrent subjects.
• The Seventh Schedule originally contained 97 Union, 66 State and 47 Concurrent entries; subsequent amendments make these original figures unsuitable as current counts.
• GST should not be treated simply as another Concurrent List subject.

3. When Parliament can legislate on State subjects

Article 249 allows the Rajya Sabha to authorise Parliamentary legislation on specified State List matters in the national interest. The resolution requires support from not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, not two-thirds of the total membership. It lasts for a maximum of one year and may be renewed for periods not exceeding one year each. The resulting law ceases to operate six months after the resolution ends, except regarding things already done or omitted.

Article 250 permits Parliament to legislate on State List matters while a National Emergency operates. Such legislation ceases to have effect six months after the Emergency ends, with protection for earlier acts and omissions. Under Article 251, States retain their law-making power during the operation of Articles 249 and 250, but an inconsistent State provision remains inoperative while the Parliamentary law continues to have effect.

Article 252 applies when legislatures of two or more States resolve that Parliament should regulate a State subject for them. Parliament may then legislate for those States, and other States may adopt the law subsequently by legislative resolution. Participating State legislatures cannot independently amend or repeal it; that requires Parliamentary legislation passed or adopted in the like manner.

Article 253 empowers Parliament to legislate for implementing treaties, international agreements, conventions and decisions of international conferences or bodies, even on State subjects. State consent is not constitutionally required. During President’s Rule, Articles 356–357 provide a separate route for Parliament to exercise State legislative powers. Unlike Article 250 laws, these laws do not automatically expire after six months; they continue until altered, repealed or amended by a competent authority.

• Article 249: national interest established through a special Rajya Sabha resolution.
• Article 250: operation of a National Emergency.
• Article 252: consent-based legislation for participating States.
• Article 253: implementation of international obligations or decisions.
• Articles 356–357: exercise of State legislative powers during President’s Rule.

4. Legislative overlap and repugnancy

Courts use the doctrine of pith and substance to identify a law’s true nature. If its essential character falls within the enacting legislature’s field, incidental encroachment into another list does not necessarily invalidate it. Harmonious construction seeks to reconcile apparently conflicting entries. Colourable legislation asks whether a legislature has indirectly attempted something beyond its constitutional competence; the focus is legislative power, not merely political motive.

Article 254 principally resolves repugnancy in the Concurrent sphere. Under Article 254(1), a valid Parliamentary law ordinarily prevails over an inconsistent State law, whether the Parliamentary law was enacted before or after it. The State law is void only to the extent of repugnancy. Mere overlap is insufficient: courts examine direct conflict, impossibility of simultaneous compliance, or whether Parliament intended an exhaustive scheme. M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) is a leading authority on these tests.

Article 254(2) provides an exception. A State law on a Concurrent subject that conflicts with an earlier Parliamentary or existing law may prevail within that State if reserved for the President’s consideration and assented to. Parliament can subsequently override it, including by adding to, amending, varying or repealing it. Presidential assent cannot cure an absence of legislative competence or a violation of Fundamental Rights.

• Conflict over legislative competence is not identical to repugnancy between two otherwise competent laws.
• Article 254(2) creates a State-specific exception, not nationwide priority for the State enactment.
• A later State law does not prevail merely because it is more recent.

5. Reservation of Bills and cooperative legislative federalism

Articles 200–201 govern reservation of State Bills for Presidential consideration. Reservation serves several constitutional purposes and is not confined to Article 254(2). A Governor must reserve a Bill which, in the Governor’s opinion, would so derogate from the High Court’s powers as to endanger its constitutional position. Presidential consideration of a reserved Bill must be distinguished from the President’s assent to Parliamentary Bills under Article 111.

Article 255 treats specified requirements of recommendation or previous sanction as procedural: omission does not by itself invalidate an enacted law where the constitutionally specified assent has been obtained. This is not a general power to cure substantive constitutional defects. Article 304(b) separately requires the President’s previous sanction before introducing a State Bill imposing reasonable restrictions on inter-State trade in the public interest.

The Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission examined Centre–State relations, including legislative consultation and reservation of State Bills. Their broader concern was to reconcile national coordination with meaningful State autonomy. Consultation before legislation affecting States, careful use of reservation, and reasoned intergovernmental dialogue strengthen federal legitimacy without changing the constitutional distribution of powers.

• For problem questions, identify the legislative entry first, then check any exceptional Parliamentary power and the applicable conflict rule.
• Do not assume every reserved State Bill concerns repugnancy.
• Distinguish constitutional requirements from desirable consultation practices.

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