Supreme Court

1. Constitutional position and composition

India has an integrated judicial system with the Supreme Court at its apex. Unlike the United States, India does not maintain entirely separate federal and State court hierarchies. The Supreme Court hears constitutional disputes as well as civil and criminal appeals. However, High Courts derive their authority directly from the Constitution and are not merely administrative branches of the Supreme Court.

Article 124 establishes the Court. The Constitution originally provided for the Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament prescribed a larger number, not more than seven other judges. Parliament regulates the number through legislation. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019 increased the sanctioned strength from 31 to 34, including the Chief Justice.

Under Article 130, the Court sits in Delhi or at another place appointed by the Chief Justice with the President’s approval. Article 129 makes it a court of record, whose records possess authoritative evidentiary value, and expressly includes the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 146 addresses its officers, servants and administrative expenses.

• Article 126: appointment of an acting Chief Justice.
• Article 127: attendance of qualified High Court judges as ad hoc judges under specified conditions.
• Article 128: attendance of retired judges, subject to constitutional conditions and their consent.

2. Appointment, qualifications and the collegium

The President appoints Supreme Court judges by warrant under the President’s hand and seal. A candidate must be an Indian citizen and must have served as a High Court judge for at least five years, practised as a High Court advocate for at least ten years, or be, in the President’s opinion, a distinguished jurist. Service or practice in two or more High Courts in succession can count. The Constitution prescribes neither a minimum appointment age nor a competitive examination.

The collegium is a judicially developed arrangement, not a body expressly named in the Constitution. The First Judges Case, S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), favoured executive primacy. The Second Judges Case (1993) established judicial primacy. The Third Judges Case, a Presidential reference decided in 1998, clarified collective consultation: recommendations for Supreme Court appointments ordinarily involve the Chief Justice and four senior-most Supreme Court judges.

The Ninety-ninth Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 sought to replace the collegium. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated this framework for violating judicial independence, a component of the basic structure. The collegium consequently continued. Appointment of the senior-most Supreme Court judge considered fit as Chief Justice is a convention reflected in the appointment procedure, not an express constitutional command.

• The executive processes recommendations and may seek reconsideration; the collegium does not itself issue appointment warrants.
• Transparency, diversity, accountability and protection against executive domination remain central reform concerns.

3. Tenure, removal and judicial independence

A judge holds office until age 65 and may resign by writing to the President. Removal is permitted only for proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Under Article 124(4), each House of Parliament must adopt an address in the same session, supported by both a majority of its total membership and at least two-thirds of members present and voting. The President then issues the removal order.

Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, initiation requires a notice signed by at least 100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha members. The Speaker or Chairman may admit or refuse it. If admitted, a three-member committee investigates. An adverse finding enables parliamentary consideration; it does not automatically remove the judge. Although commonly called impeachment, the Constitution uses the language of removal.

Independence is supported by security of tenure, protected service conditions and expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. Charged expenditure may be discussed but is not voted upon. Article 121 restricts parliamentary discussion of judges’ conduct except upon a removal motion. Article 124(7) prohibits a former Supreme Court judge from pleading or acting before any court or authority within India.

• Article 125 protects privileges, allowances and rights concerning leave and pension against disadvantageous variation after appointment.
• Article 360 permits directions reducing judges’ salaries and allowances during a Financial Emergency.
• Article 50, a Directive Principle, calls for separation of the judiciary from the executive in the State’s public services.

4. Original, writ, appellate and advisory jurisdiction

Article 131 gives the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction over specified disputes between the Union and States or among States, provided the dispute concerns the existence or extent of a legal right. It does not cover every political disagreement or ordinary dispute involving a private person. Constitutional exclusions also matter: Article 262 permits Parliament to exclude court jurisdiction over specified inter-State water disputes.

Article 32 guarantees access to the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. It can issue habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto. High Courts’ Article 226 jurisdiction is wider in subject matter because it extends to fundamental rights and other legal rights. Article 32 is itself a fundamental right; Article 226 is not.

Articles 132–134 provide appellate routes in constitutional, civil and criminal matters; Article 134A concerns certificates for appeal. Article 136 permits discretionary special leave to appeal from decisions of courts or tribunals, except those constituted under laws relating to the Armed Forces. Special leave is not an automatic right of appeal.

Under Article 143(1), the President may refer a question of public importance involving law or fact; the Court may decline to answer. Article 143(2) separately covers certain treaty-related disputes excluded from Article 131. An advisory opinion is not an ordinary executable decree and does not bind the President.

5. Judicial review, precedent and corrective powers

Judicial review enables scrutiny of legislation and executive action for constitutional validity. Its foundations include Articles 13, 32 and the wider constitutional scheme. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), a thirteen-judge Bench held that Parliament’s Article 368 amending power cannot destroy the Constitution’s basic structure. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) reaffirmed limited amending power and judicial review.

Article 141 makes the law declared by the Court binding, rather than converting every factual observation into a universal rule. Smaller Benches must follow larger-Bench rulings; disagreement requires reference through the appropriate procedure. Article 142 permits orders necessary for complete justice in a pending cause or matter, but is not an unrestricted licence to disregard substantive law. Article 144 requires all civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Court.

Article 137 authorises review of the Court’s judgments, subject to applicable law and rules. Review is not a routine rehearing. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) recognised the exceptional curative petition after dismissal of review to prevent abuse of process and gross miscarriage of justice. Public interest litigation relaxed standing requirements, particularly where disadvantaged groups could not effectively approach courts themselves.

6. Institutional challenges and examination approach

The Supreme Court must balance constitutional adjudication with a heavy appellate workload. Delay, litigation costs, uneven access, vacancies and the volume of special leave petitions affect this balance. The Law Commission’s 229th Report (2009) proposed a Constitution Bench at Delhi and cassation benches in regional locations. This remains a reform proposal, not the existing institutional arrangement.

E-filing, virtual hearings, publication of judgments and legal-aid mechanisms can improve access, but digital exclusion and language barriers require attention. For Prelims, separate constitutional text from statutes, judicial interpretation and convention. Distinguish sanctioned strength from vacancies, review from appeal, and judicial independence from immunity against accountability.

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