Left-wing extremism

Origins and ideology

The Naxalite movement began in May 1967 at Naxalbari in Darjeeling district, when tribal peasants revolted against landlords. Charu Majumdar's 'annihilation of class enemies' line and the Charu Mazumdar-Kanu Sanyal leadership inspired similar uprisings, notably Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh. The movement splintered repeatedly until the 2004 merger created the CPI (Maoist), which pursues New Democratic Revolution through a 'protracted people's war' — mobilising guerrilla zones in the countryside to eventually encircle cities.

Maoist strategy rests on the 'compact revolutionary zone' stretching from the Nepal border through Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh — the so-called Red Corridor. The party's military wing, the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), operates in dalams (squads), with frontal organisations handling recruitment among students, workers and tribals.

• 1967: Naxalbari uprising; 1969: CPI (M-L) founded.
• 1980: People's War Group founded by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah in Andhra Pradesh.
• 2004: PWG + MCCI = CPI (Maoist).
• PLGA is the armed wing; Dandakaranya is its strongest guerrilla zone.

Root causes: why LWE thrives where it does

LWE is strongest where the state is weakest. The Fifth Schedule areas of central India suffer chronic land alienation: tribal land passes to non-tribals through debt and fraud despite protective laws. Forest rights were historically denied — the Forest Rights Act, 2006 came only after decades of conflict over minor forest produce and displacement by mining and dams. Poverty, poor health and education indicators, and absent administration create the vacuum Maoists fill with 'janatana sarkars' (people's governments).

The Planning Commission's 2008 Expert Group on Development Issues to Deal with Causes of Discontent, Unrest and Extremism concluded that LWE is fundamentally a development and governance failure, not merely a law-and-order problem. Mining-led displacement without fair rehabilitation, and contractor-driven exploitation of tendu and bamboo, remain live grievances.

• Fifth Schedule and PESA 1996 protect tribal self-governance but are weakly implemented.
• Forest Rights Act 2006 recognises individual and community forest rights.
• Mining belts of Bastar, Dantewada and Gadchiroli overlap almost exactly with LWE strongholds.
• Maoists tax tendu leaf trade and mining contractors to finance operations.

The state's response: security plus development

India's counter-LWE strategy combines operations by state police and Central Armed Police Forces (notably the CRPF's CoBRA battalions), intelligence-led targeted action, and area domination through fortified police stations, with a development offensive: roads under the Road Connectivity Project for LWE areas, mobile towers, banks, schools and the Aspirational Districts Programme. Surrender and rehabilitation policies offer money, training and land to cadres who quit.

Results have been dramatic. LWE violence fell from a peak of over 2,200 incidents in 2009 to a few hundred by 2024. The 2024-25 offensive in Chhattisgarh — with new security camps deep inside Abujhmad and the killing of CPI (Maoist) general secretary Nambala Keshava Rao alias Basavaraju in May 2025 — broke the organisation's top leadership. The Union Home Ministry has set March 2026 as the deadline to eliminate LWE as an organised armed challenge.

• CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) is CRPF's jungle-warfare unit, raised 2008.
• SAMADHAN doctrine (2017) integrates intelligence, technology and finance choking.
• Greyhounds (Telangana/AP) is the elite state anti-Naxal force.
• Surrender policies vary by state; leadership cadres get higher rehabilitation packages.

Challenges and the road ahead

Even as armed strength declines, challenges remain: improvised explosive devices cause most security-force casualties; Maoists exploit state boundaries to slip across jurisdictions; and frontal organisations attempt urban penetration. Civil-society critics warn against excesses — the Salwa Judum vigilante experiment (2005-11) was struck down by the Supreme Court in Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) as unconstitutional.

The endgame requires consolidating governance in liberated areas: delivering PESA and FRA rights in letter and spirit, ensuring mining benefits reach local communities, building trust between tribals and the police, and integrating surrendered cadres. Without this, military victory could prove temporary.

• IEDs account for the majority of security-force deaths in LWE areas.
• Nandini Sundar judgment (2011): state cannot arm civilians as Special Police Officers.
• Urban Naxal networks: alleged recruitment and funding through civil-society fronts.
• Post-victory consolidation needs roads, banks, schools and honest local administration.

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