Radicalisation

What radicalisation is and how it works

Radicalisation is a process, not an event. Models such as the NYPD's four-stage framework (pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, jihadisation) and Fathali Moghaddam's 'staircase to terrorism' describe a progression from grievance to violence. Not every radical becomes a terrorist, but every home-grown terrorist has passed through radicalisation. Drivers include perceived injustice, identity crisis, search for belonging, and exposure to extremist narratives that frame violence as duty or redemption.

The internet has collapsed the distance between recruiter and recruit. Where earlier radicalisation needed physical networks — mosques, madrasas, prisons, training camps — today's self-radicalised individual consumes propaganda, receives operational guidance and declares allegiance entirely online. Encryption frustrates surveillance, and algorithms create echo chambers that accelerate extremism.

• Grievance + identity crisis + extremist narrative + online community = radicalisation pathway.
• Lone wolves self-select targets and attack without orders, making detection extremely hard.
• Prisons and conflict zones are traditional radicalisation hubs; the internet is the new one.

The Indian experience

India's encounter with global jihadist radicalisation has been comparatively limited. Despite a Muslim population of about 200 million, fewer than 200 Indians joined ISIS, and Al-Qaeda's 2014 announcement of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) found little traction. Analysts credit India's syncretic Islamic traditions, family and community structures, democratic outlets for grievance, and effective intelligence work.

The principal hotspots have been Kerala (Gulf-linked Salafist networks and the 2016 migration of 21 people to Nangarhar), the old Indian Mujahideen network in Maharashtra, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, and modules in Tamil Nadu (Coimbatore 2022 car blast) and Bengaluru (Rameshwaram Cafe blast, March 2024). The Popular Front of India (PFI), banned in 2022 under UAPA, was accused of channelling radicalisation and terror finance. Communal radicalisation on the majoritarian side — mob lynching, hate speech and vigilante networks — is a parallel concern that feeds a cycle of polarisation.

• ISHP (ISIS Hind Province) announced 2019; Wilayat al-Hind propaganda targets Indian recruits.
• PFI banned under UAPA in September 2022 for alleged terror links.
• Indian Mujahideen (2007-13) was the first major home-grown jihadi network.
• Communal polarisation is both a driver and a consequence of radicalisation.

Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation

Counter-radicalisation aims to prevent the process from starting; de-radicalisation aims to reverse it. India's approach is decentralised: state police run counselling programmes (Maharashtra's initiative with community elders, Kerala's de-radicalisation camps, Telangana's counselling of ISIS sympathisers), while central agencies disrupt networks and block content. Key elements include engaging credible religious scholars to counter extremist theology, family involvement, vocational rehabilitation, and monitoring of released extremists.

At the policy level, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) proposal — stalled since 2010 over federalism concerns — envisaged a dedicated counter-radicalisation mandate. India participates in global initiatives such as the Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist content online and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. The Information Technology Act's Section 69A is used to block extremist websites and accounts.

• De-radicalisation toolkit: counselling, counter-theology, family engagement, skills, monitoring.
• Section 69A IT Act blocks unlawful online content.
• Christchurch Call (2019): India is a signatory to curb online terror content.
• NCTC remains unestablished; intelligence fusion happens through MAC instead.

Challenges: encryption, free speech and the online battlefield

The hardest problem is technological. End-to-end encryption blinds intelligence agencies to plotting; platform cooperation is inconsistent; and content takedowns chase an endless supply of mirrors and new accounts. India's demands for traceability (IT Rules 2021) have collided with platform resistance and privacy litigation, leaving the encryption question unresolved.

Equally difficult is the legal-ethical balance: aggressive surveillance and speech restrictions risk alienating the very communities whose cooperation is essential, and can themselves become radicalising grievances. Best practice internationally — and increasingly in Indian state programmes — emphasises community partnership, early intervention with at-risk youth, and counter-narratives that amplify credible voices rather than state propaganda.

• End-to-end encryption is the single biggest operational obstacle.
• IT Rules 2021 traceability requirement is contested in court.
• Alienating communities through over-policing is counter-productive.
• Counter-narratives work best from credible religious and community voices.

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