Pakistan

1. Historical foundations and strategic significance

India–Pakistan relations originated in Partition, which created territorial disputes, large-scale displacement and competing national narratives. The 1947–48 war led to a ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971, the latter resulting in Bangladesh’s independence, deepened strategic mistrust. Nuclear tests by both countries in May 1998 added a deterrence dimension without eliminating conventional confrontation, as the 1999 Kargil conflict demonstrated.

The 1972 Simla Agreement committed both sides to peaceful settlement through bilateral negotiations or other peaceful means mutually agreed upon. It also provided for respect for the Line of Control without prejudice to either side’s recognised position. India invokes this bilateral framework against efforts to internationalise the Kashmir dispute. The February 1999 Lahore Declaration sought confidence-building, including measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear use, but the subsequent Kargil conflict undermined its momentum.

Pakistan matters to India beyond the bilateral dispute. Instability along the western frontier affects defence planning, internal security and the resources available for development. Pakistan’s geography influences India’s access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while its strategic partnership with China complicates India’s security environment. A stable relationship could improve South Asian connectivity; however, India distinguishes good-neighbourly engagement from accommodation of coercion or terrorism.

• Analytical lens: examine security, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics and external powers together.
• Avoid treating Pakistani society, its civilian government and its military establishment as identical actors.

2. Core disputes and security challenges

Jammu and Kashmir remains the principal territorial and political dispute. India maintains that the entire former princely state is an integral part of India and regards constitutional changes concerning its territory as internal matters. Pakistan contests India’s position. Following India’s August 2019 constitutional changes concerning Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan downgraded diplomatic relations and suspended bilateral trade, with limited exceptions subsequently affecting particular transactions.

Cross-border terrorism is the central obstacle identified by India. The 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2016 Pathankot and Uri attacks repeatedly disrupted engagement. The February 2019 Pulwama attack was followed by India’s Balakot air strike and an aerial confrontation. India seeks verifiable action against organisations including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, dismantling of terrorist infrastructure and accountability for attacks. The challenge is to deter violence while controlling escalation between nuclear-armed states.

Other territorial issues require differentiated treatment. In Siachen, military deployment dates from India’s Operation Meghdoot in 1984; proposals for demilitarisation confront disagreements over authentication of existing troop positions. Sir Creek concerns a disputed tidal estuary in the Rann of Kutch region and affects maritime delimitation. Fishermen are particularly vulnerable because maritime boundaries are difficult to identify at sea.

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty allocated the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—to India and the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—to Pakistan, subject to specified rights and obligations. It permits certain Indian uses of western rivers, including hydropower under prescribed conditions. Disputes over projects such as Kishenganga and Ratle involve technical design and treaty interpretation. Water diplomacy therefore requires legal precision, rather than the assumption that allocation means absolute exclusion of all upstream uses.

• Nuclear deterrence reduces incentives for full-scale war but does not automatically prevent terrorism or limited conflict.
• Separate territorial negotiation, counterterrorism requirements and technical water disputes in an analytical answer.

3. Diplomatic instruments and confidence-building

India’s Pakistan policy has combined engagement, deterrence and selective cooperation. Summit diplomacy, foreign-secretary talks, backchannel contacts and the earlier Composite Dialogue attempted to address disputes alongside trade and people-to-people contacts. These processes repeatedly encountered violence and domestic political opposition. Sustainable dialogue therefore depends not only on diplomatic announcements but also on implementation and credible restraint.

Military communication helps contain immediate risks. The Directors General of Military Operations provide a channel for addressing incidents along the Line of Control. In February 2021, they reaffirmed strict observance of ceasefire agreements and understandings. Other confidence-building measures include advance notification of ballistic missile tests and annual exchanges of lists of nuclear installations under the 1988 agreement prohibiting attacks on such facilities, which entered into force in 1991.

Humanitarian cooperation offers a narrower but valuable space. Exchanges of prisoner lists, consular access, release of fishermen and medical travel can reduce avoidable suffering. The Kartarpur Corridor, opened in November 2019, enables eligible pilgrims from India to visit Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan without a visa, subject to corridor procedures. Its operation illustrates how religious and humanitarian arrangements can be insulated, at least partly, from wider diplomatic hostility.

• Confidence-building measures manage risk; they are not substitutes for resolving the underlying causes of mistrust.
• Soft power is most useful as a supporting instrument, not as a replacement for counterterrorism action.

4. Economic, regional and external dimensions

Economic links have remained far below geographical potential. India withdrew most-favoured-nation treatment for Pakistan after the Pulwama attack and imposed a 200 per cent customs duty on Pakistani goods in February 2019. Pakistan’s subsequent suspension of bilateral trade further restricted formal commerce. Consumers and producers can lose from longer trading routes and higher transaction costs, but economic interdependence alone cannot overcome serious security concerns.

Bilateral tensions also constrain the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Its last summit before the reference-period endpoint was held in Kathmandu in 2014; the proposed 2016 Islamabad summit was postponed after several members declined participation. India has consequently pursued additional regional platforms, including BIMSTEC, and subregional connectivity arrangements. These are not exact substitutes for SAARC because they have different memberships and geographic priorities.

China’s close defence and economic relationship with Pakistan is a major strategic variable. India objects to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor because it passes through territory in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir claimed by India and administered by Pakistan. Developments in Afghanistan also affect terrorism, regional access and Pakistan’s strategic calculations. External actors may encourage de-escalation, but India rejects imposed mediation on Kashmir.

Multilateral mechanisms can support accountability. Pakistan was placed under the Financial Action Task Force’s increased monitoring in 2018 and removed in October 2022 after completing action plans. Removal did not constitute a blanket certification that terrorism-related concerns had disappeared. India also uses UN Security Council sanctions mechanisms and international diplomatic outreach to seek action against terrorist individuals and organisations.

5. Policy choices and an exam-ready way forward

A balanced Indian approach should combine credible deterrence with reliable communication. Counterterrorism demands require measurable implementation, while military hotlines and crisis procedures should remain available to prevent miscalculation. Technical discussions on water, prisoners and border management need not imply acceptance of the other side’s political claims. Such compartmentalisation preserves practical cooperation without overlooking core security interests.

Any wider normalisation should be incremental and reciprocal. Humanitarian releases, predictable pilgrimage arrangements and carefully assessed trade facilitation can build constituencies for stability. Larger initiatives require political ownership and evidence that commitments will survive changes in leadership and civil–military dynamics. Public diplomacy should avoid demonising populations, since enduring peace ultimately depends on social acceptance as well as state agreements.

For GS-II, avoid both unconditional optimism about dialogue and the claim that diplomatic disengagement resolves every threat. The realistic objective is a peaceful neighbourhood in which sovereignty, security and development reinforce one another. Progress should be assessed through reduced violence, effective crisis management and implementation of commitments rather than the frequency of summits alone.

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