Article 356

1. Constitutional purpose and grounds

Article 356 belongs to Part XVIII of the Constitution, dealing with emergency provisions. It permits intervention when the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The President acts on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers under Article 74, not as an independent political authority.

Article 355 imposes a duty on the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure constitutional government in every State. Article 356 supplies an exceptional constitutional mechanism for addressing a failure of such government. Ordinary administrative inefficiency, electoral defeat of the ruling party in parliamentary elections, or disagreement with Union policies does not by itself establish constitutional breakdown.

Article 365 provides that failure to comply with Union directions issued under constitutional provisions may permit the President to hold that constitutional government has become impossible. It does not make President’s Rule automatic: the circumstances and supporting material remain relevant and judicially reviewable.

• The phrase 'on receipt of a report from the Governor or otherwise' allows action without a Governor’s report.
• A hung Assembly is not automatically a constitutional breakdown; feasible alternatives for forming a responsible ministry should first be explored.
• Loss of legislative majority should ordinarily be established through a floor test, not the Governor’s private assessment.

2. Approval, duration and revocation

Every proclamation under Article 356 must be laid before each House of Parliament. Unless it is a proclamation revoking an earlier one, it ceases to operate after two months without approval by both Houses. Approval requires an ordinary majority of members present and voting, unlike the special majority required for a National Emergency under Article 352.

If the Lok Sabha is dissolved when the proclamation is issued, or is dissolved during the initial two-month period, approval by the Rajya Sabha can keep it alive until thirty days after the first sitting of the reconstituted Lok Sabha. The new Lok Sabha must approve it within that period. A related safeguard applies when dissolution affects a continuation resolution.

Once approved, President’s Rule operates for six months from the date of issue. Both Houses may approve further six-month periods, ordinarily up to three years in total. Beyond one year, two conditions must coexist: a National Emergency must operate in the whole of India or the whole or any part of the State, and the Election Commission must certify that difficulties in holding Assembly elections necessitate continuation.

The President may revoke the proclamation through a subsequent proclamation without obtaining parliamentary approval. The Forty-fourth Amendment strengthened the conditions for continuation beyond one year and restored six-monthly parliamentary approval in place of the one-year approval cycle introduced by the Forty-second Amendment.

• For continuation beyond one year, National Emergency and Election Commission certification are cumulative, not alternative, conditions.
• The three-year rule is the general constitutional ceiling; historically, special constitutional amendments created exceptional arrangements for Punjab.

3. Effects on State institutions

The President may assume all or any functions of the State government and powers vested in the Governor or other State authorities, except the State Legislature. In practice, the Council of Ministers is displaced and administration is carried on through the Governor under Union control. The Assembly may initially remain in suspended animation rather than being immediately dissolved.

The proclamation may declare that the State Legislature’s powers are exercisable by or under Parliament’s authority. Under Article 357, Parliament may confer lawmaking power on the President and permit further delegation subject to conditions. A law made through this arrangement does not automatically expire when President’s Rule ends; it continues until altered or repealed by a competent legislature or authority.

Article 356 expressly protects the High Court: the President cannot assume its powers or suspend constitutional provisions relating to High Courts. President’s Rule also does not automatically suspend Fundamental Rights. Unlike Article 352, it does not require war, external aggression or armed rebellion.

• Suspended animation keeps the Assembly legally in existence but prevents it from functioning normally.
• Parliament’s legislative role during President’s Rule is distinct from the Union executive’s administration of the State.
• Before parliamentary approval, irreversible dissolution of the Assembly is impermissible under the Bommai safeguards.

4. Judicial safeguards and landmark cases

In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977), the Supreme Court adopted a restrained approach to examining presidential satisfaction, while not treating the power as wholly beyond review. The decisive federal safeguard came in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), decided by a nine-judge Bench.

Bommai held that an Article 356 proclamation is judicially reviewable. Courts can examine whether relevant material existed and whether the action was mala fide or based on wholly irrelevant or extraneous considerations. They do not ordinarily substitute their assessment of the adequacy of relevant material for that of the executive. Although Article 74(2) protects ministerial advice from judicial inquiry, the underlying material is not thereby shielded.

The Court emphasised that federalism and secularism are basic constitutional features. A ministry’s majority should ordinarily be tested on the Assembly floor. If a proclamation is unconstitutional, courts can restore the dismissed government and revive the Assembly. Parliamentary approval does not cure constitutional illegality.

In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), concerning Bihar’s Assembly dissolution in 2005, the Court rejected dissolution based on speculative claims about improper government formation. It declared the dissolution unconstitutional but did not restore the Assembly because the fresh election process had advanced. The case illustrates that a Governor’s report must rest on constitutionally relevant, verifiable material.

• Judicial review tests constitutional legality, not merely whether Parliament supported the proclamation.
• A floor test addresses legislative confidence; it cannot resolve every possible form of constitutional breakdown.
• Bommai recognised that State action undermining secular constitutional governance may justify Article 356 intervention.

5. Federalism, reform and examination approach

Article 356 creates tension between the Union’s responsibility to preserve constitutional government and the democratic autonomy of States. Repeated partisan use can convert an emergency safeguard into a means of political centralisation. Conversely, refusing intervention despite genuine constitutional collapse can undermine constitutional rights and responsible government.

The Sarkaria Commission recommended using Article 356 very sparingly, as a last resort after alternatives have failed. Ordinarily, the State should receive a warning and an opportunity to correct the problem, unless urgent circumstances make this impracticable. The Governor’s report should be a reasoned account supported by facts rather than a political assertion.

The Punchhi Commission also sought stronger safeguards and explored localised emergency intervention to avoid displacing an entire State government for a breakdown confined to a limited area. Such proposals must be distinguished from the existing constitutional text. The operative examination framework remains Article 356 read with Articles 355, 357 and 365, parliamentary control and Supreme Court doctrine.

• Separate grounds, approval, duration and effects when solving statement-based questions.
• Do not import Article 352 rules on special majority or written Cabinet advice into Article 356.
• Remember that constitutional breakdown is a higher threshold than poor administration or political instability alone.

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