Governor

1. Constitutional position, appointment and tenure

Article 153 provides for a Governor for each State, while permitting one person to serve multiple States. Article 154 vests the State’s executive power in the Governor, exercisable directly or through subordinate officers in accordance with the Constitution. This formal vesting must be read with parliamentary government: real executive authority ordinarily belongs to the Council of Ministers responsible to the Legislative Assembly.

Under Article 155, the President appoints the Governor by warrant under the President’s hand and seal. In practice, the President acts on Union ministerial advice. Articles 157–158 prescribe qualifications and conditions: the Governor must be an Indian citizen aged at least 35, cannot simultaneously be a member of Parliament or a State legislature, and cannot hold another office of profit. Emoluments and allowances cannot be diminished during the term.

Article 156 provides a five-year term, subject to presidential pleasure; the incumbent continues until a successor enters office. Resignation is addressed to the President. There is no impeachment procedure for a Governor. In B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010), the Supreme Court held that removal cannot be arbitrary, capricious or based merely on political incompatibility. Reasons need not routinely be disclosed, but the exercise of pleasure remains open to limited judicial review.

The oath under Article 159 is administered by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned or, in that judge’s absence, the senior-most available judge. Article 361 provides personal constitutional immunity, including protection against criminal proceedings during tenure; it does not place the legality of gubernatorial action beyond judicial review.

2. Executive, legislative, financial and judicial functions

The Governor appoints the Chief Minister and, on the Chief Minister’s advice, other ministers under Article 164. Ministers are collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. The Governor also appoints the Advocate General under Article 165 and State Public Service Commission members under Article 316. An important distinction is that State Public Service Commission members are removed by the President, not the Governor, under Article 317.

Under Articles 174–176, the Governor summons and prorogues the legislature, dissolves the Assembly, and delivers the constitutionally required special address. These functions normally operate on ministerial advice. Where a Legislative Council exists, the Governor nominates approximately one-sixth of its members under Article 171 from persons with specified knowledge or practical experience.

Article 200 concerns assent to State Bills. The Governor may assent, withhold assent or reserve a Bill for the President. A non-Money Bill may be returned with a message for reconsideration. If the legislature passes it again, the Governor cannot withhold assent. Reservation is mandatory when, in the Governor’s opinion, a Bill would so derogate from the High Court’s powers as to endanger its constitutional position. Article 201 governs Bills reserved for the President.

The Governor causes the annual financial statement to be laid before the legislature under Article 202. Money Bills require the Governor’s recommendation for introduction, and demands for grants require recommendation under Article 203. Article 213 permits ordinances when the Assembly is not in session or, in a bicameral State, when both Houses are not in session, if immediate action is necessary. Ordinances ordinarily cease six weeks after reassembly. Under Article 161, clemency extends to offences concerning matters within the State’s executive power; unlike Article 72, it does not confer a separate power over court-martial sentences.

3. Ministerial advice and the limits of discretion

Article 163 establishes a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor, except where the Constitution requires discretion. In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974), the Supreme Court affirmed that the President and Governors are constitutional heads who ordinarily act on ministerial advice. Article 163 is not a reservoir of unrestricted personal power.

Constitutionally sensitive situations include identifying a Chief Minister when no party has a clear majority, determining whether objective material warrants a floor test, reserving Bills in constitutionally recognised circumstances, and reporting a possible breakdown of constitutional machinery under Article 356. Specific provisions, including those concerning certain tribal areas and special responsibilities, may confer additional functions. These must be examined provision by provision.

A floor test is the appropriate institutional method for resolving genuine doubts about an incumbent government’s legislative majority. The Governor should not decide majority support through personal political assessments or substitute Raj Bhavan for the Assembly. However, a floor test itself cannot be ordered merely to intervene in an internal party dispute.

Article 167 requires the Chief Minister to communicate specified information concerning administration and legislation. The Governor may seek information and require a matter decided by an individual minister to be placed before the Council. This supports constitutional consultation, not a parallel executive administration.

4. Federal controversies and judicial safeguards

Recurring disputes concern government formation, dismissal, Assembly sessions, assent to Bills and reports recommending President’s Rule. Union appointment combined with political partisanship can weaken State autonomy. In Hargovind Pant v. Dr. Raghukul Tilak (1979), the Supreme Court explained that the Governor is not an employee or servant of the Union government.

In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Court subjected Article 356 proclamations to judicial review and emphasised legislative testing of disputed majorities. A Governor’s report is relevant material, not conclusive proof of constitutional breakdown. President’s Rule can also be proclaimed without such a report.

In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Court rejected unilateral gubernatorial interference with the Arunachal Pradesh Assembly’s session and agenda. In Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), it held that the material before the Governor did not justify ordering a floor test merely on the basis of the intra-party dispute.

In State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023), the Court rejected using gubernatorial powers to obstruct ordinary lawmaking. For examinations, distinguish Article 200’s constitutional text from evolving judicial directions concerning delay: the Article itself does not prescribe a numerical deadline for the Governor’s initial decision.

5. Reform proposals and an examination framework

The Sarkaria Commission recommended an eminent person from outside the State, detached from local politics and not closely involved in recent active politics. It supported effective consultation with the Chief Minister in selection and sparing use of Article 356 as a last resort. These are recommendations, not binding appointment qualifications.

The Punchhi Commission favoured greater security of tenure, removal safeguards and dispensing with the convention of assigning Governors statutory roles such as university Chancellor. Such university functions generally arise from State legislation, not from an inherent constitutional power of the Governor.

A balanced answer should avoid both extremes: portraying the Governor as a powerless ceremonial figure or as a political supervisor of the State government. Test every disputed action against its constitutional source, the ordinary requirement of ministerial advice, objective evidence, legislative accountability and judicial review. Reform requires impartial appointments, transparent constitutional reasoning and respect for elected institutions.

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