EVM

1. Meaning, components and operation

An Electronic Voting Machine records votes electronically instead of requiring voters to mark paper ballots. In the ECI system, the Ballot Unit is placed inside the voting compartment, while the Control Unit remains with the polling officer. The officer enables a vote, after which the elector presses the button against a candidate’s name and symbol, or NOTA. The machine then locks against another vote until enabled again.

The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail, or VVPAT, adds a visible paper record. It briefly displays a printed slip containing the selected candidate’s serial number, name and symbol behind a transparent window, ordinarily for about seven seconds. The slip then falls into a sealed compartment. Voters cannot take it away: retaining the slip within the system protects ballot secrecy and prevents its use as proof of a purchased vote.

ECI EVMs are battery-operated, standalone machines, not internet voting devices. They do not require mains electricity or connect to the internet, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. This reduces exposure to remote cyberattacks, but does not eliminate the need for secure manufacture, handling, storage and independent verification. Claims about networked voting systems abroad should therefore not automatically be applied to Indian EVMs.

• Ballot Unit: voter-facing panel displaying candidates and voting buttons.
• Control Unit: enables polling and stores electronically recorded votes.
• VVPAT: creates a voter-visible paper record available for prescribed verification.

2. Constitutional and statutory framework

Article 324 provides the institutional foundation for ECI supervision, while Article 326 establishes adult suffrage for Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assembly elections. Article 327 empowers Parliament to legislate on these elections. Neither Article 324 nor Article 326 itself prescribes electronic voting: the detailed authority comes from election legislation and rules.

In A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, 1984, the Supreme Court considered electronic voting introduced in part of a Kerala Assembly constituency without supporting statutory rules. It held that the Commission could supplement the law where necessary, but could not override an existing statutory framework. Parliament subsequently inserted Section 61A into the Representation of the People Act, 1951 through the 1988 amendment, effective in 1989, enabling voting machines in constituencies specified by the ECI.

The Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 regulate machine-based polling and counting. Rule 49MA provides a procedure when an elector alleges that the VVPAT printed an incorrect choice. Rule 56D allows an application for counting VVPAT slips, subject to the Returning Officer’s reasoned decision. Where such a paper count differs from the corresponding electronic count, the result sheet is amended according to the paper-slip count.

Local-body elections require a separate institutional distinction. Under Articles 243K and 243ZA, State Election Commissions supervise panchayat and municipal elections respectively. Their equipment and procedures should not automatically be treated as identical to those prescribed by the ECI for parliamentary and Assembly elections.

3. Safeguards throughout the election cycle

EVM credibility rests on a combination of technical design, administrative controls and scrutiny by political participants. Before deployment, machines undergo first-level checking by authorised engineers, with recognised political parties invited to observe. Randomisation determines allocation to constituencies and subsequently polling stations, making advance identification of a particular machine’s destination more difficult.

Candidate-setting, sealing and mock polls provide additional checkpoints. On polling day, a mock poll is conducted before actual voting in the presence of available polling agents. Its electronic results are checked against the corresponding VVPAT slips. Mock-poll data must then be cleared and those slips removed and handled according to instructions before actual polling starts.

After polling, machines are sealed and transported under prescribed security arrangements. Polled machines are kept in secured strong rooms with access controls, surveillance and opportunities for candidate representatives to observe arrangements. Polling agents receive the account of votes recorded in Form 17C, which supports comparison with the vote totals produced during counting.

These measures create a chain of custody: each transfer and procedural checkpoint should be documented and open to authorised scrutiny. A broken seal, unrecorded movement or failure to clear mock-poll data is not automatically evidence of a manipulated election, but each requires examination and remedial action under the applicable rules.

4. VVPAT verification and judicial scrutiny

In Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission of India, 2013, the Supreme Court recognised the paper trail as an indispensable requirement of free and fair elections and directed phased introduction of VVPATs. The judgment linked voter confidence to an ability to verify that the recorded choice corresponded to the vote cast.

In N. Chandrababu Naidu v. Union of India, 2019, the Court increased mandatory VVPAT verification from one to five randomly selected polling stations per Assembly constituency or per Assembly segment of a parliamentary constituency. This is five polling stations, not five per cent of polling stations. The provision does not mean that every VVPAT slip in a constituency is routinely counted.

In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, decided on 26 April 2024, the Supreme Court declined to order a return to paper ballots or universal VVPAT-slip counting. It directed that Symbol Loading Units be sealed and secured for at least 45 days after declaration of results. It also provided for manufacturer-engineer verification of the burnt memory or microcontroller in five per cent of EVMs per Assembly constituency or segment, on a timely written request from candidates finishing second or third.

Under the 2024 directions, such a request must be made within seven days of result declaration. The requesting candidate bears the verification expense, refundable if tampering is found. This technical-verification mechanism is distinct from routine counting of VVPAT slips; aspirants should not merge the two procedures.

5. Benefits, limitations and reform priorities

EVMs enable faster counting, reduce dependence on printed ballot papers and eliminate invalid votes caused by ambiguous marking of ordinary paper ballots. Battery operation supports deployment in areas with unreliable electricity. Nevertheless, machine reliability and election integrity are different questions: voter intimidation, inducements, impersonation and misuse of campaign resources cannot be resolved by voting technology alone.

The central debate concerns verifiability and public confidence, not merely counting speed. Malfunction does not necessarily establish tampering, while a standalone design does not remove every possible physical or insider risk. Meaningful safeguards require transparent procedures, trained staff, secure custody and credible investigation of complaints.

Reform discussions should examine statistically justified audit design, clear mismatch-resolution procedures, timely publication of verification outcomes and accessible voter education. Risk-limiting audits are a proposed statistical approach that can expand checking when evidence warrants; they should not be confused with India’s existing fixed-number VVPAT verification rule. The objective is an electoral system that is efficient, secret, inclusive and demonstrably trustworthy.

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