Management runs the business; governance determines who can question management, verify its claims and require correction. A profitable company may still be badly governed if its profits depend on hidden risks, silenced employees or transactions favouring controllers.
CSR expenditure is one obligation within corporate responsibility, not a substitute for honest accounts, safe production or board oversight.
Real pictures
Two views of the corporation
The shareholder–stakeholder debate frames most questions about business ethics.
Milton Friedman (1912–2006)
His 1970 essay argued that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits within the rules of the game — the shareholder-primacy view.
Image: Bachrach Studios · Public domain · Wikimedia Commons
Concept diagram
The board is accountable beyond the boardroom
A stakeholder-connected boardroom links oversight to those who bear corporate decisions and risks.
- Corporate governance concerns direction, control and accountability.
- CSR is one obligation, not a substitute for lawful, ethical core operations.
Shareholder primacy and stakeholder responsibility
Shareholder-oriented view
- Milton Friedman’s 1970 argument emphasised business responsibility to increase profits within the rules of the game.
- Highlights managerial accountability for entrusted capital; it should not be reduced to permission for fraud or illegality.
Stakeholder view
- R. Edward Freeman’s stakeholder approach examines relationships with employees, customers, suppliers, investors and communities.
- Recognises that sustainable value depends on parties who bear risks even without voting shares.
An answer should specify whose interests are affected and how directors justify trade-offs, rather than claim every stakeholder preference can always be satisfied.
Oversight architecture and its failure modes
| Actor | Expected contribution | Warning sign |
|---|---|---|
| Board | Set direction, oversee risk and question management with adequate information. | Meetings approve complex proposals without meaningful challenge. |
| Independent directors | Bring independent judgement and scrutinise conflicts and management claims. | Formal independence coexists with dependence on promoters for information or reappointment. |
| Audit committee and auditors | Scrutinise reporting, controls and assurance within their respective roles. | Unverified balances, unexplained exceptions and non-audit relationships compromise scrutiny. |
| Shareholders, including minorities | Exercise voting and other legal rights; question dilution and related-party benefits. | Controllers extract private benefits while minority investors bear losses. |
| Workers and affected communities | Provide early warnings about operational hazards and externalised costs. | Retaliation prevents safety or environmental concerns from reaching the board. |
Indian legal anchors: avoid universalising thresholds
| Provision or framework | Exam-safe statement |
|---|---|
| Companies Act 2013, section 149 | Listed public companies require at least one-third independent directors; prescribed classes of public companies also face requirements. At least one woman director is required for prescribed classes, not every company. SEBI requirements can be more demanding for covered listed entities. |
| Section 177 | Audit committees are required for listed public companies and prescribed classes. The provision also establishes vigil-mechanism requirements for specified companies. |
| Section 135: CSR applicability | Applies where net worth is at least ₹500 crore, turnover at least ₹1,000 crore, or net profit at least ₹5 crore during the immediately preceding financial year. These are alternative triggers. |
| Section 135: spending | Qualifying companies must spend at least 2% of average net profits of the three immediately preceding financial years, or available preceding years for younger companies, subject to statutory computation and unspent-amount rules. It is not 2% of turnover. |
| SEBI LODR Regulations, 2015 | Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements govern covered listed entities; the Kotak Committee’s 2017 report informed governance reforms. A recommendation is not itself an operative regulation. |
| BRSR | Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting links business disclosures to environmental, social and governance matters. Do not treat publication as proof of verified sustainability performance. |
Vignette: a green report beside a concealed leak
The board’s problem
- A manufacturing company seeks a public contract using its sustainability report. An internal engineer reports that a waste-treatment bypass is omitted from the report; management calls it temporary and asks the audit committee to wait until bidding ends.
- Investor disclosure, community health, fair procurement and employee safety intersect. A charitable programme cannot offset a concealed operational hazard.
A credible governance response
- Secure evidence, stop or contain unsafe operations through responsible management, obtain independent technical verification and protect the engineer against retaliation. The board should receive direct findings rather than a filtered management summary.
- Make legally required disclosures and notifications, correct misleading bid or sustainability claims and commission remediation. Determine individual responsibility fairly; do not assume an untested allegation is a final finding.
Historical and conceptual anchors
- The UK Cadbury Report, 1992, helped consolidate modern attention to board accountability, financial reporting and control.
- Satyam’s 2009 accounting scandal illustrates why reported balances, auditor assurance and board reputation require independent verification; avoid unsupported accusations against other firms.
- ESG is a broad risk and responsibility lens; CSR is a defined spending and governance obligation for qualifying companies; neither replaces compliance across operations.
Corporate-governance traps
Statements examiners like to twist — learn the correct version.
Every company must appoint a woman director and spend 2% on CSR.
The director requirement applies to prescribed classes; CSR applies only when statutory eligibility conditions are met.
An independent director’s title proves independent judgement.
Information access, competence, incentives and willingness to challenge determine substantive independence.
High CSR spending cancels harm from fraud or pollution.
Philanthropy does not extinguish duties of truthful disclosure, prevention, remediation or legal accountability.
Prelims focus
- Remember CSR eligibility uses net worth OR turnover OR net profit; spending is based on average net profits.
- Distinguish board oversight, operational management, audit assurance and sustainability disclosure.
Mains angle
- PYQ-style: Why can formally compliant boards fail ethically? Examine information asymmetry, promoter influence and weak challenge.
- Use prevention, independent verification, protected voice, disclosure and remedy as separate governance functions.
Flip & recall
Answer in your head first, then tap the card to check.
Practice MCQs
Original Prelims-style questions with explanations.
0 / 3 correct · 3 left
Q1.A company meets only the ₹1,000 crore turnover trigger under section 135. Which is correct?
Q2.Which statement about woman directors is accurate?
Q3.Which action most strengthens substantive board independence?
