Coastal security

Why the coast matters: threat profile

The sea was historically India's open flank. The 1993 Mumbai blasts used coastal landing points to smuggle RDX; 26/11 proved that a determined enemy could sail hundreds of kilometres and land in India's financial capital. Beyond terrorism, the coast faces smuggling of gold, drugs (the Arabian Sea route from Afghanistan via Pakistan), arms and contraband; illegal fishing; human trafficking; and piracy in the Arabian Sea. Island territories and the 1,197 islands, many uninhabited, offer hideouts and landing points.

The economic stakes amplify the security imperative: over 90% of India's trade by volume moves by sea; major ports, refineries, LNG terminals, offshore oil installations (Bombay High) and nuclear plants (Tarapur, Kudankulam, Kalpakkam) sit on the coast. A successful attack on any of these would be a national economic event, not just a security incident.

• 26/11 and 1993 blasts both exploited the sea route.
• Drug smuggling via the Arabian Sea is a growing narco-terror channel.
• Ports, refineries, offshore rigs and nuclear plants are high-value coastal targets.
• Uninhabited islands and fishing fleets are surveillance blind spots.

The post-26/11 architecture

The 26/11 attacks triggered a comprehensive overhaul. Operational responsibility was clarified: the Navy was made responsible for overall maritime security including coastal and offshore security; the Coast Guard for territorial waters; and State Marine Police — a new force created under the Coastal Security Scheme — for the shoreline belt. Joint Operations Centres were established at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair, and coastal security coordination committees at national, state and district levels.

Surveillance was the second pillar. A chain of coastal radar stations (46 in phase one, expanded later with 38 more including island territories) covers the coastline; the NC3I network links naval and coast guard nodes; and the IMAC at Gurugram, the nerve centre of the National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project, fuses data from radars, AIS transponders, satellite tracking and intelligence to build a recognised maritime picture. The National Maritime Security Coordinator (2022) now provides apex coordination.

• Navy: overall maritime security; Coast Guard: territorial waters; Marine Police: shoreline.
• Joint Operations Centres at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi, Port Blair.
• Coastal radar chain + NC3I + IMAC = maritime domain awareness.
• National Maritime Security Coordinator appointed in 2022.

State Marine Police and the community layer

State Marine Police are the weakest and most critical link. Created under the Coastal Security Scheme (2005 onwards), they operate over 200 coastal police stations with interceptor boats, but suffer from manpower shortages, poor training in maritime operations, boat maintenance issues and unclear jurisdiction. The 2021 expansion approved more stations, boats and manpower, and the Sagarmala programme has funded coastal infrastructure.

Fishermen are the eyes and ears of coastal security: over 2 lakh fishing boats operate along the coast. Measures include biometric ID cards for fishermen, colour-coding and registration of boats, AIS transponders on larger vessels, and community awareness programmes. Sagar Kavach exercises test the whole system — from radar detection to marine police interception — and have repeatedly exposed and fixed gaps.

• Coastal Security Scheme funds marine police stations, boats and jetties.
• Fishermen ID cards, boat registration and AIS transponders aid identification.
• Sagar Kavach exercises test inter-agency coastal response.
• Marine police capacity remains the weakest link.

Challenges and the way forward

Persistent challenges include the sheer scale of legitimate sea traffic that hides threats (dhows, fishing boats, merchant traffic), the slow modernisation of marine police, coordination frictions among a dozen agencies, and new vectors: sea drones, semi-submersibles for drug runs, and the use of mother ships to transfer contraband to small boats beyond radar coverage. The 2021-24 seizures of multi-hundred-kg drug consignments off Gujarat and Kerala show the scale of the maritime drug trade.

The way forward combines technology (satellite-based tracking of small vessels, AI-enabled anomaly detection at IMAC), capacity (marine police professionalisation, more interceptor craft), legal tools (the Maritime Anti-Piracy Act 2022 filled a long-standing gap) and regional cooperation through the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Colombo Security Conclave and information-fusion centres in Gurugram (IFC-IOR) that share shipping data with partner countries.

• Mother ships transfer drugs to small boats beyond radar coverage.
• Maritime Anti-Piracy Act 2022 gave India a dedicated piracy law.
• IFC-IOR (Gurugram) shares maritime data with 20+ partner nations.
• Colombo Security Conclave (India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius) deepens regional cooperation.

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