Maldives

1. Geographical and strategic significance

The Maldives is a low-lying archipelagic state in the central Indian Ocean, southwest of India and Sri Lanka. Its dispersed islands occupy a maritime space far larger than its land area. Located near major shipping routes connecting the Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean with East Asia, it matters for maritime awareness, commercial shipping and regional stability. Its location does not mean that it controls these international sea lanes.

For India, the Maldives is closely connected to the security of Lakshadweep and the wider maritime approaches to the western coast. Cooperation supports surveillance against trafficking, illegal fishing and other transnational threats. The concern is not simply the presence of another foreign partner, but the possibility that infrastructure, intelligence arrangements or military access could acquire strategic uses detrimental to India.

The relationship fits India’s Neighbourhood First policy and the SAGAR approach, articulated in 2015 as Security and Growth for All in the Region. The Maldives, however, is an independent actor rather than merely an arena of India–China competition. Its priorities include sovereignty, tourism revenues, affordable infrastructure, employment and climate resilience. Effective Indian diplomacy must connect maritime security with these everyday developmental needs.

• Geographical linkage: proximity to Lakshadweep and important Indian Ocean shipping routes.
• Institutional linkage: SAARC, IORA, the United Nations and Commonwealth engagement.
• Strategic principle: respect sovereign choices while addressing concrete security risks.

2. Political relations and the sovereignty question

India recognised the Maldives after independence in 1965. A defining moment came in November 1988, when Operation Cactus helped defeat a coup attempt at the request of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. India’s rapid response established its reputation as a security provider. Nevertheless, the relationship has experienced periodic strains as Maldivian governments and political parties debate the appropriate extent of cooperation with external powers.

Relations strengthened under President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih during 2018–2023, with an India First approach and expanded infrastructure and defence cooperation. Conversely, the India Out campaign portrayed the presence of Indian military personnel as a sovereignty concern. President Mohamed Muizzu, elected in 2023, sought their withdrawal. These personnel had operated and maintained Indian-provided aviation platforms used for medical evacuation and related services; their presence should not be equated with a large Indian military base.

By May 2024, India replaced the military personnel with civilian technical personnel through a negotiated arrangement. This preserved useful services while addressing a politically sensitive demand. Muizzu attended the Indian Prime Minister’s swearing-in ceremony in June 2024 and visited India in October. The subsequent partnership vision showed that disagreement on one issue need not prevent broader cooperation.

A central lesson is to distinguish relations with a government from relations with a society. Excessive identification with one political party can make Indian projects vulnerable to electoral competition. Sustained parliamentary, business, educational and community contacts can reduce this vulnerability without interfering in domestic politics.

3. Development, economic and people-centred cooperation

India supports Maldivian connectivity, water and sanitation, health, education and community infrastructure. The Greater Malé Connectivity Project links Malé with Villingili, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi through bridges and causeways. Its announced Indian financing comprises a US$100 million grant and a US$400 million line of credit. The project illustrates how infrastructure can support housing, port-related activity and economic decongestion around the capital.

High-impact community development projects provide a complementary model: smaller facilities can produce visible benefits beyond Malé and spread cooperation across inhabited islands. Training, scholarships and capacity-building programmes strengthen administrative and professional skills. The Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Malé and access to treatment in India anchor the health dimension of bilateral relations.

Economic ties include Indian supplies of essential commodities, construction materials and pharmaceuticals, alongside tourism and Maldivian demand for services. India has facilitated essential exports through bilateral arrangements, helping an import-dependent island economy. Social-media disputes and tourism boycott campaigns in early 2024 nevertheless demonstrated how public sentiment can disrupt people-to-people relations and commercial interests.

The Maldivian economy is vulnerable to tourism shocks, expensive imports and external debt repayments. During Muizzu’s October 2024 visit, India extended support through a US$400 million and ₹30 billion currency-swap arrangement under the SAARC framework. Such liquidity support can ease immediate foreign-exchange pressures but cannot replace fiscal adjustment, productive investment or credible debt management. Development diplomacy should therefore emphasise transparent terms, timely delivery and local ownership.

• Grants finance agreed activities without repayment obligations; lines of credit are repayable financing.
• Currency swaps address liquidity needs and should not be described as unconditional grants.
• Evaluate projects through public benefits, environmental safeguards and lifecycle costs, not announcement values alone.

4. Maritime security, China and non-traditional threats

India and the Maldives cooperate through training, exercises, maritime surveillance and assistance to the Maldives National Defence Force. Ekuverin is their bilateral military exercise. Dosti began as an India–Maldives coast guard exercise and subsequently included Sri Lanka. The Colombo Security Conclave provides another platform for cooperation on maritime security, terrorism, trafficking, cyber security and humanitarian assistance.

China is an important infrastructure and economic partner of the Maldives. The China–Maldives Friendship Bridge, opened in 2018, is a prominent example. Muizzu’s January 2024 visit to China and a defence-assistance agreement signed in March reflected continuing diversification of external partnerships. Visits by Chinese research vessels raise Indian concerns about the potential strategic value of oceanographic data. However, a port call or commercial project is not, by itself, evidence of a permanent military base.

India should avoid treating every Chinese-financed asset as proof of a predetermined debt-trap strategy. Debt sustainability depends on aggregate liabilities, borrowing terms, revenues and domestic fiscal choices. Equally, legitimate concerns about dual-use facilities and opaque security arrangements merit sustained dialogue rather than public coercion.

Non-traditional threats are equally consequential. Coral degradation, coastal erosion, freshwater scarcity and sea-level rise threaten livelihoods and infrastructure. Violent extremism and foreign-fighter networks have also raised security concerns, but responses should target specific risks rather than stigmatise Maldivian society. Joint disaster preparedness, coastal protection, renewable energy and climate finance can make the partnership more resilient.

5. Policy priorities and GS-II assessment

India’s comparative advantages are proximity, rapid emergency response, accessible healthcare, established social connections and experience in capacity building. Their diplomatic value depends on reliability. Delayed projects, insufficient consultation or rhetoric suggesting entitlement can erode goodwill. India should prioritise completion of existing commitments, clear public communication and consultation with communities affected by infrastructure projects.

A balanced strategy combines sensitivity on sovereignty with consistency on security. Civilian operation of aviation platforms offers one example of adapting implementation without abandoning cooperation. Institutionalised consultations can address vessel visits, surveillance arrangements and emergency access. Climate-resilient infrastructure, sustainable fisheries and diversified tourism should accompany traditional defence engagement.

For GS-II, the Maldives illustrates small-state agency, asymmetric interdependence and the domestic sources of foreign policy. The objective should not be exclusive alignment with India, but a stable neighbour that sees Indian cooperation as beneficial and dependable. Partnership based on consent and tangible outcomes is more sustainable than attempting to compel loyalty.

• Build cross-party and society-wide relationships without intervening in elections.
• Combine financial support with transparent, sustainable project design.
• Protect maritime interests through dialogue, capacity building and regional institutions.

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