Afghanistan

1. Why Afghanistan matters to India

Afghanistan lies at the meeting point of South Asia, Central Asia and the Iranian plateau. Its mountain passes and trading centres historically linked the Indian subcontinent with wider Eurasia. The Hindu Kush, difficult terrain and landlocked geography shape its security and economic dependence on neighbouring transit routes. For India, Afghanistan is a near neighbourhood concern even though Pakistan-controlled territory prevents direct overland access.

Security is the foremost interest. Instability can provide space for transnational terrorist organisations, illicit arms networks and narcotics trafficking. India is particularly concerned about groups targeting Indian interests and about Afghan territory being used to support violence elsewhere. The Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP, are distinct organisations: ISKP is an adversary of the Taliban, while assessments of other militant relationships require separate examination.

Afghanistan also matters for access to Central Asian markets, energy resources and Eurasian transport networks. A stable, sovereign Afghanistan would reduce regional insecurity and expand economic opportunities. Cultural connections, educational exchanges, medical travel and the historical presence of Afghan Sikh and Hindu communities give the relationship a societal dimension beyond strategic competition.

2. From development partnership to the Taliban’s return

Following the fall of the first Taliban regime in 2001, India supported Afghanistan’s reconstruction through assistance largely delivered as grants. Unlike the United States and NATO countries, India did not deploy combat forces. Its approach concentrated on infrastructure, institutions, scholarships, healthcare and community development, seeking legitimacy through visible benefits to ordinary Afghans.

The October 2011 Strategic Partnership Agreement provided a framework for political consultation, economic cooperation, capacity-building and assistance to Afghan security institutions. Major projects included the Afghan Parliament building in Kabul, inaugurated in 2015; the Afghan-India Friendship Dam in Herat, inaugurated in 2016; and the approximately 218-kilometre Zaranj–Delaram road, completed in 2009. Smaller projects in education, health, irrigation and electricity broadened the partnership’s reach.

The US–Taliban agreement signed at Doha on 29 February 2020 created a framework for foreign troop withdrawal and Taliban counterterrorism commitments, but did not itself establish a lasting intra-Afghan settlement. The Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 as the republic collapsed. India evacuated personnel and other eligible persons under Operation Devi Shakti. The episode demonstrated that development goodwill cannot substitute for a viable domestic political settlement and sustainable security institutions.

3. Engagement, recognition and humanitarian diplomacy

The Taliban’s return required India to reconcile practical engagement with concerns over legitimacy, terrorism and rights. Diplomatic contact with authorities exercising effective control is not equivalent to formal recognition of their government. India’s initial post-2021 approach combined security assessment, humanitarian assistance and gradually restored contact, rather than either complete isolation or unconditional acceptance.

India’s technical team returned to the embassy in Kabul in June 2022 to coordinate assistance and related engagement. Humanitarian deliveries included wheat, medicines, vaccines and disaster relief, with international organisations helping distribution. Assistance routed through the World Food Programme illustrated how India could support the population while reducing dependence on direct budgetary transfers to the de facto authorities.

UN Security Council Resolution 2593 remains an important reference point. It demanded that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country, shelter or train terrorists, or plan or finance terrorist acts. It also stressed humanitarian access and the rights of women, children and minorities. Taliban restrictions on girls’ secondary education, women’s university education and employment undermine both human rights and Afghanistan’s long-term development capacity.

An exam answer should distinguish humanitarian exemptions from blanket sanctions relief and distinguish engagement from endorsement. Afghanistan’s economic distress also reflects disrupted aid, banking constraints, weak employment opportunities and repeated natural disasters. Policy should therefore assess the civilian consequences of restrictions while retaining targeted pressure against sanctioned actors.

4. Connectivity and the regional strategic environment

Pakistan’s location and transit policies constrain India’s access to Afghanistan. Islamabad has historically sought influence in Kabul partly through its conception of strategic depth. However, Taliban–Pakistan relations are not automatically harmonious: the Durand Line, border incidents and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, create serious friction. The Afghan Taliban and TTP are organisationally distinct despite ideological and historical connections.

Iran’s Chabahar port offers an alternative route bypassing Pakistan. The 2016 India–Iran–Afghanistan transport and transit agreement envisaged movement through Iran into Afghanistan. The Zaranj–Delaram road links the Iranian border area to Afghanistan’s principal road network. India’s May 2024 long-term contract for operating the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar reinforced this connectivity objective, although sanctions exposure, finance, logistics and Afghan security remain constraints.

Regional interests overlap without fully converging. Iran is concerned with border stability, refugees, water and Shia communities. Central Asian states seek border security, trade and protection from militant spillovers. China emphasises security concerns relating to Xinjiang and explores economic opportunities; Russia prioritises regional security and influence. India therefore uses multiple forums, including UN processes, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and regional consultations. It hosted the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in November 2021, though China and Pakistan did not participate.

5. Policy priorities and a balanced way forward

India’s immediate priority should remain verifiable prevention of threats to its citizens, missions and territory. Regular contact can improve situational awareness, but Taliban assurances require assessment against observable conduct. Counterterrorism cooperation should address financing, travel and recruitment networks while avoiding the mistaken assumption that the Taliban’s conflict with ISKP eliminates all terrorist risks.

A people-centred policy should preserve food and medical assistance, scholarships, feasible educational access and support for vulnerable groups. Women’s participation is not merely a diplomatic condition: excluding half the population damages household welfare, public services and economic recovery. Community-level projects can preserve India’s goodwill, but new commitments require credible monitoring, local security and arrangements for maintenance.

Strategically, India should diversify access through Iran and Central Asia, coordinate with partners where interests overlap, and resist reducing Afghanistan to an India–Pakistan contest. Engagement should be calibrated and reversible, guided by security outcomes, humanitarian access, rights and broader political inclusion. The objective is a stable, sovereign Afghanistan that is not a platform for threats against others, rather than exclusive influence over Kabul.

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