Water sharing

1. Why shared rivers matter strategically

South Asia’s rivers are simultaneously economic lifelines and sources of strategic vulnerability. The Indus supports irrigated agriculture in India and Pakistan; the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna system sustains densely populated plains and the Bangladesh delta. Tributaries originating in Nepal and Bhutan provide hydropower opportunities but also transmit floods across borders. Monsoon seasonality produces a recurring contradiction: destructive surpluses during the rains and politically contentious shortages during the dry season.

India cannot apply a uniform upper-riparian doctrine across its neighbourhood. It is downstream of China on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej, downstream of Nepal on several Ganga tributaries, and upstream of Bangladesh on many shared rivers. Credible diplomacy therefore requires consistency: development rights should be accompanied by information sharing, reasonable consideration of downstream interests and cooperation over transboundary risks.

Water disputes are rarely explained by scarcity alone. Historical mistrust, security crises, competing crop patterns, infrastructure choices and inadequate data can transform technical disagreements into questions of sovereignty. Conversely, river cooperation can create durable channels of communication even when broader political relations deteriorate.

2. Pakistan: the Indus framework and its strategic stress

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan, with the World Bank also a signatory for specified purposes. It assigned the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—to India and the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—to Pakistan, while permitting specified Indian uses of western-river waters. These include domestic and non-consumptive uses, limited agricultural use, and hydropower subject to treaty conditions.

Its institutional architecture includes the Permanent Indus Commission and procedures for resolving questions, differences and disputes. Depending on their nature and treaty provisions, issues may go to a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration. The World Bank has defined procedural responsibilities; it is not a general guarantor empowered to decide every dispute. Projects such as Kishenganga and Ratle illustrate how reservoir design, pondage and outlet specifications become politically sensitive.

Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack, India announced on 23 April 2025 that the treaty would be held in abeyance until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures support for cross-border terrorism. Pakistan rejected this position. The treaty contains no express unilateral suspension clause and provides for termination through a duly ratified treaty between the governments, making the announcement legally and diplomatically contested. It should not be equated with instant physical control over all western-river flows: diversion and storage depend on infrastructure, geography and time.

3. Bangladesh: dry-season allocation and domestic federalism

India and Bangladesh established their Joint Rivers Commission in 1972. Their principal allocation instrument is the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, signed on 12 December 1996 for 30 years. It provides for sharing at Farakka during 1 January–31 May through ten-day periods and an availability-based formula, alongside monitoring and consultation arrangements. Its 2026 renewal horizon makes dependable flow data, changing water demands and ecological requirements especially important.

The Teesta remains the most prominent unresolved allocation issue. A proposed interim agreement was not concluded during the Indian Prime Minister’s 2011 visit to Bangladesh amid objections from West Bengal. Lean-season flows support irrigation in northern West Bengal and northwestern Bangladesh. A credible settlement requires reliable availability estimates, realistic agricultural demand management and consultation with affected communities rather than an allocation formula detached from basin conditions.

Smaller agreements demonstrate the scope for incremental cooperation. In 2019, the countries signed an MoU permitting India to withdraw 1.82 cusecs from the Feni River for drinking-water supply to Sabroom in Tripura. A 2022 MoU addressed withdrawal from the common border stretch of the Kushiyara. Within India, water is principally a State List subject, subject to Union powers over inter-state rivers, while foreign affairs and treaties are Union responsibilities. State governments do not possess a general constitutional veto over treaties, but their cooperation is often indispensable for implementation.

4. Nepal, Bhutan and China: cooperation beyond allocation

India-Nepal water relations encompass the Kosi Agreement of 1954, revised in 1966; the Gandak Agreement of 1959, amended in 1964; and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996. The Mahakali framework covers the Sarada and Tanakpur barrages and the proposed Pancheshwar multipurpose project. Despite potential gains from electricity, irrigation and flood moderation, implementation has faced disagreements over benefit assessment, costs, rehabilitation and perceived asymmetry between the neighbours.

India-Bhutan cooperation is primarily organised around hydropower development and electricity trade rather than a broad volumetric allocation treaty. Projects such as Tala and Mangdechhu generate export revenue for Bhutan and supply electricity to India. Future cooperation must account for financing risks, geological uncertainty, aquatic ecology and glacial lake outburst floods, rather than treating installed capacity as the sole measure of success.

India and China have no comprehensive water-sharing treaty. Cooperation has included arrangements for flood-season hydrological information on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej and an Expert-Level Mechanism established in 2006. Chinese infrastructure on the Yarlung Tsangpo, which enters India as the Siang and later forms part of the Brahmaputra system, raises concerns about transparency, sediment, flow regulation and seismic risks. However, downstream rainfall and tributaries also contribute substantially to the basin; alarmist claims that upstream control alone can simply dry up the entire Brahmaputra are hydrologically misleading.

5. Principles and priorities for resilient water diplomacy

International water law provides useful principles: equitable and reasonable utilisation, prevention of significant transboundary harm, cooperation and information exchange. Equitable use does not mean equal division; relevant considerations include population dependence, existing uses, ecological requirements and available alternatives. India is not a party to the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Specific bilateral obligations must therefore be distinguished from convention provisions and applicable customary rules.

Climate change increases uncertainty through altered precipitation, glacier retreat, extreme floods and changing seasonal flows. Treaties based mainly on historical water volumes may inadequately address drought, groundwater-surface water interactions, sediment or environmental flows. Adaptive arrangements should use jointly verified data, periodic scientific reviews, agreed drought procedures and reliable emergency notification without automatically reopening every political bargain.

The practical way forward is to shift from dividing water alone to sharing benefits. Joint hydropower, flood forecasting, navigation, wetland protection and efficient irrigation can expand mutual gains. India should institutionalise consultation with states, strengthen basin research and include local livelihoods in project appraisal. A sound approach combines national security with technical credibility: protect essential interests while preserving channels that reduce accidental harm and sustain long-term regional trust.

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