UNCTAD Greenfield Investment Report: India’s Lead over China and the FDI Reality Check

What the report says—and what it does not establish

The supplied article reports India’s share of global greenfield investment at 5.7% during 2020–25, against China’s 2.8%. Malaysia and Indonesia accounted for 4% and 3.8%, respectively. These figures support the India–China comparison, but the selected country figures do not establish India’s global rank.

The article does not reproduce the underlying dataset’s methodology. It therefore does not allow a definitive assessment of whether the country shares are calculated from project counts or investment values, how projects are dated, or how revisions and cancellations are treated. The comparison should retain its stated period and metric rather than being presented as a ranking of total FDI inflows.

• A share of global investment is not the same as a domestic investment growth rate.
• A higher share does not, by itself, establish higher absolute investment than in an earlier period.
• India’s lead on this measure does not establish a lead over China in manufacturing output, exports or accumulated FDI stock.

Greenfield announcements versus realised FDI

Greenfield announcement datasets capture proposed new projects and, where available, their announced investment values. Announcements indicate investor intentions, but projects may be phased, resized, delayed or cancelled. An announced project’s full value need not enter the host economy during the announcement year.

Realised FDI flows record cross-border financial transactions under the applicable statistical framework. They can finance new facilities, acquisitions or existing operations. Conversely, a greenfield project may also use domestic borrowing or other financing that is not an inward FDI flow.

The correct interpretation is that greenfield announcements indicate the investment pipeline, FDI flows indicate cross-border financing, and commissioned capacity indicates execution. The supplied article’s figures should not be described as money already received or factories already operating.

• Compare announcements with announcements and realised flows with realised flows.
• Check project counts versus values, annual versus cumulative periods, and gross versus net flows.
• Use commissioning, employment and domestic sourcing data to assess development outcomes.

Strategic-sector concentration and India’s supply-chain opportunity

The report states that strategic sectors’ share of global greenfield investment rose from 16% in 2020 to 44% in 2025. The article identifies AI infrastructure and related technologies, the semiconductor value chain, and energy-transition technologies and services as major investment areas.

Strategic investment nevertheless remains geographically concentrated: Europe accounted for 28.4%, North America for 28%, and developing Asia for 26.5%. UNCTAD identifies China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore as leading developing-Asian jurisdictions for new investment, while highlighting integration challenges for the Global South, especially least developed countries.

For India, the opportunity is not merely to host final assembly or capital-intensive facilities. Deeper gains require participation in design, components, equipment services, research and supplier networks. However, the supplied evidence does not provide India-specific sectoral shares and therefore cannot establish that India leads China in AI, semiconductors or energy-transition investment.

• AI infrastructure requires reliable electricity, digital connectivity and resource-efficient infrastructure.
• Semiconductor participation depends on specialised skills, precision suppliers, dependable utilities and logistics.
• Energy-transition investment should be assessed for technology capability and domestic value addition, not merely installation capacity.

Industrial policy: judge results, not the number of measures

India implemented 1,416 industrial policy measures during 2008–21 and 707 during 2022–25, according to the article. The later period is substantially shorter, so raw totals should not be compared without accounting for duration. The article also reports that the United States, China, Australia and Brazil implemented more measures than India during 2022–25.

Policy counts indicate the extent of intervention, not its effectiveness. A measure supporting research, a tariff change and a production incentive can have very different economic effects. Evaluation must focus on additional investment, productivity, technological learning, fiscal cost and competition.

UNCTAD projects Indian GDP growth of 7.3% in 2026 and 6.8% in 2027, supported by domestic demand, manufacturing capacity and public infrastructure. These are projections, not realised growth outcomes. The report also cautions that higher prices and input costs are restraining consumption expansion, while oil-import dependence remains a vulnerability.

• Industrial incentives should address identifiable coordination failures or capability gaps.
• Public infrastructure and predictable regulation can benefit a wider range of firms than narrowly targeted subsidies.
• Strong aggregate growth does not eliminate household purchasing-power pressures or project-level execution risks.