Border disputes

1. Conceptual and diplomatic framework

Border disputes arise when states disagree over sovereignty, the interpretation of historical treaties, the course of rivers, or the precise alignment of a boundary. Colonial-era maps and surveys often left ambiguities that became politically sensitive after independence. India’s experience illustrates the distinction between settlement, which resolves legal title or alignment, and management, which limits violence and friction while negotiations continue.

The International Boundary, Line of Control and Line of Actual Control have different legal and political meanings. The LoC records the military division in Jammu and Kashmir under the framework of the 1972 Simla Agreement; it is not an international boundary. The LAC separates areas under Indian and Chinese control, but its alignment is not jointly clarified throughout. Divergent perceptions can therefore produce encounters even where neither side regards itself as crossing the line.

Neighbourhood diplomacy requires simultaneous attention to external negotiations and domestic legitimacy. Parliament, border states, armed forces, survey agencies and local communities have distinct roles. Following the Supreme Court’s Berubari opinion of 1960, cession of Indian territory requires constitutional amendment; merely determining a disputed boundary need not amount to cession. Legal scrutiny is thus essential when designing settlements.

• Delimitation: legal description of the boundary through treaties, coordinates and maps.
• Demarcation: physical identification through pillars, markers and surveys.
• Border management: regulation of movement, security and civilian activity along a boundary or control line.

2. India–China: unresolved boundary and crisis management

The India–China boundary question covers western, middle and eastern sectors. In the west, China controls Aksai Chin, which India claims as part of Ladakh. In the east, China contests the McMahon Line and claims much of Arunachal Pradesh, particularly highlighting Tawang. Smaller disputed pockets exist in the middle sector. India also rejects the 1963 China–Pakistan boundary agreement concerning territory in the Shaksgam Valley, which India regards as its own.

The 1962 war established the enduring security context. Agreements in 1993 and 1996 sought to maintain peace and regulate military activity along the LAC, while the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles provided a framework for settlement. The Special Representatives mechanism addresses the boundary question; the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination and military commander-level meetings support operational crisis management.

The 2020 eastern Ladakh crisis, including fatalities in the Galwan Valley, severely damaged confidence. Disengagement at individual friction points must be distinguished from de-escalation, which reduces wider military deployments, and from final boundary settlement. In October 2024, India announced an agreement on patrolling arrangements that led to disengagement at Depsang and Demchok. This did not resolve the boundary question.

India’s challenge is to improve roads, logistics, surveillance and civilian infrastructure without allowing competitive deployments to generate uncontrollable escalation. Diplomatic dialogue remains necessary, but durable normalisation depends on credible implementation of agreements and peace in border areas.

• Doklam in 2017 concerned territory disputed between Bhutan and China; India’s involvement reflected close security ties with Bhutan and strategic concerns near the Siliguri Corridor.
• Patrolling restrictions or buffer arrangements are operational measures, not automatically a transfer of sovereignty.

3. Pakistan: territorial conflict, military lines and Sir Creek

The India–Pakistan dispute over Jammu and Kashmir combines territorial claims, military confrontation and cross-border terrorism. India maintains that the entire former princely state legally acceded to India in 1947. Pakistan controls parts of the territory claimed by India. The Simla Agreement committed both countries to resolving differences through bilateral negotiations or other mutually agreed peaceful means and to respecting the LoC without prejudice to their stated positions.

Beyond map reference NJ9842, the 1949 Karachi Agreement described the ceasefire line as proceeding north to the glaciers without fully delineating the glaciated region. Competing interpretations contributed to confrontation in Siachen, where India launched Operation Meghdoot in 1984. Present military positions are described by the Actual Ground Position Line. Authentication of existing positions and safeguards against reoccupation remain important considerations in proposals for demilitarisation.

Sir Creek is a separate dispute involving a tidal estuary between Gujarat and Sindh. Pakistan favours the creek’s eastern bank as the boundary, while India favours a mid-channel alignment. The thalweg principle concerns the principal navigable channel, but its application depends on legal and factual circumstances. Resolving the land terminus would assist maritime delimitation, affecting fishing grounds and potential offshore resources.

The February 2021 reaffirmation of the ceasefire understanding by the Directors General of Military Operations illustrated how operational communication can reduce immediate risks without resolving sovereignty disputes. Humanitarian arrangements for detained fishermen and inadvertent crossers should remain insulated from wider political tensions.

• Distinguish the International Boundary, LoC and Actual Ground Position Line in answers and maps.
• Do not equate ceasefire observance with a comprehensive political settlement.

4. Nepal, Bangladesh and other neighbouring frontiers

India and Nepal share an open-border relationship with deep social, economic and security linkages. The 1816 Treaty of Sugauli identified the Kali River as Nepal’s western boundary. Differences over the river’s source underlie competing claims concerning Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura. Nepal’s revised map in 2020 included these areas; India rejected the claims. Susta presents a separate dispute connected with historical river alignment and changes in the Gandak or Narayani system.

The appropriate response combines political dialogue with joint examination of archival maps, hydrological evidence and surveys. Treating Nepal’s concerns only through a security lens can intensify domestic nationalism. Conversely, open-border movement should not be confused with an absence of sovereignty: consensual regulation, pillar maintenance and action against trafficking remain legitimate requirements.

Bangladesh demonstrates that difficult boundaries can be settled through negotiated reciprocity. The 1974 Land Boundary Agreement and its 2011 Protocol addressed enclaves, adverse possessions and undemarcated stretches. India’s Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015 enabled implementation. Separately, a 2014 arbitral award under UNCLOS delimited the India–Bangladesh maritime boundary, showing the usefulness of an accepted legal process.

India and Sri Lanka established maritime boundaries through agreements in 1974 and 1976. Katchatheevu remains politically contentious in India, but recurring fishing conflicts should not be described simply as an undelimited-boundary dispute. Along the Myanmar frontier, insurgency, refugee movements, fencing and movement rules principally raise border-management questions. India and Bhutan do not have a major unresolved bilateral territorial dispute.

• Riverine boundaries require agreed rules on erosion, accretion and channel shifts rather than unilateral reliance on the present river course.
• Maritime delimitation and fishing access are related but legally distinct issues.

5. A balanced strategy for neighbourhood diplomacy

First, separate final settlement from immediate risk reduction. Hotlines, flag meetings, incident protocols, advance notification of exercises and reliable verification can prevent local encounters from escalating. Confidence-building measures need clear geographical scope and implementation arrangements; ambiguous commitments are vulnerable during crises.

Second, invest in legal and technical capacity. Joint surveys, georeferenced historical maps, satellite imagery and mutually authenticated records can narrow factual disagreement. International adjudication or arbitration is useful where states consent, as in the Bangladesh maritime case; it is not an automatic substitute for bilateral diplomacy.

Third, make border residents stakeholders. All-weather access, telecommunications, schools, health services and livelihood support improve both welfare and situational awareness. The Vibrant Villages Programme illustrates the linkage between frontier development and strategic resilience. Projects must respect mountain ecology and incorporate disaster-risk assessment.

Finally, pursue phased, politically sustainable agreements. Humanitarian releases, local trade arrangements and restoration of communication may be feasible before territorial compromise. Transparent consultation with affected states and communities, constitutional compliance and realistic public communication strengthen legitimacy. Strategic firmness is most effective when accompanied by patient diplomacy rather than maximalist rhetoric.

• For GS-II, connect sovereignty and security with federal consultation, international law and people-centred diplomacy.
• Evaluate outcomes separately: fewer incidents, restored access, reduced deployments and final settlement are different benchmarks.

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