The claim that an algorithm is unfair can raise three different questions: what fairness means, which fairness principle should govern selection, and how to redesign this particular system. Meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics organise these questions; they are levels of inquiry, not successive historical periods.
Describing what people believe is descriptive inquiry. It does not by itself establish what they ought to believe or do.
Concept diagram
The landscape of ethical inquiry
Meta-ethics asks about moral meaning, truth and justification. Normative theories guide judgement; applied ethics tests concrete problems.
- Meta-ethics asks about moral meaning, truth and justification.
- Normative theories guide judgement; applied ethics tests concrete problems.
Locate the question before answering it
| Level | Typical question | Appropriate reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Descriptive | Which groups regard this practice as acceptable? | Surveys, history and social explanation. |
| Meta-ethical | Are moral claims truth-apt, and what could justify them? | Analyse meaning, moral knowledge and the status of moral facts. |
| Normative | What makes an action right or a distribution just? | Defend standards such as duty, welfare, virtue or fair cooperation. |
| Applied | Should this recruitment algorithm be deployed? | Connect standards with verified facts, legal duties and feasible alternatives. |
Meta-ethical signposts, accurately separated
David Hume
Is–ought problem
A normative conclusion requires justification beyond a list of descriptive premises; widespread behaviour alone cannot establish duty.
G. E. Moore
Open-question argument
Even after identifying good with a proposed natural property, asking whether that property is good appears meaningful. His naturalistic-fallacy critique is not merely a ban on discussing nature.
A. J. Ayer
Emotivism
Moral utterances express attitudes rather than state ordinary factual propositions; this differs from moral realism.
Normative branches and cross-cutting concerns
| Approach | Primary focus | Blind spot to test |
|---|---|---|
| Deontology | Obligations and constraints | Conflicting duties and the handling of serious consequences. |
| Consequentialism | Outcomes of actions, rules or other objects of evaluation | Measurement, uncertainty and unequal burdens. |
| Virtue ethics | Excellent character and practical wisdom | How to specify action and check claims of virtue. |
| Justice and rights | Fair terms and protected claims | Whether formal entitlements are usable in practice. |
| Care | Relationships, vulnerability and responsiveness | How to avoid partiality and sustain fair public standards. |
Original vignette: a recruitment model labelled objective
Unpack the claim
- A department proposes ranking applicants with a model trained on earlier selections. Officials say past selections are factual, so the model must be fair.
- Historical data may reproduce exclusion. The inference from past practice to justified practice crosses an unsupported is–ought gap.
Match remedy to question
- Specify job-relevant criteria and lawful equality duties; independently test errors across relevant groups and examine whether candidates can challenge inaccurate data.
- A meta-ethical debate alone cannot certify the software. Deployment requires evidence, accountable human authority and an effective correction route.
Distinctions that prevent weak answers
Statements examiners like to twist — learn the correct version.
Meta-ethics means having no moral commitments.
It investigates the status and justification of those commitments; it is not a synonym for indifference.
All consequentialists are utilitarians.
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist family centred on welfare; other consequentialist accounts value different outcomes.
A map proves that all theories can be reconciled.
Theories sometimes give incompatible rankings. Mapping clarifies the disagreement rather than dissolving it.
Prelims focus
- Distinguish moral realism from universal agreement: an objective claim need not be accepted by everyone.
- Do not equate Moore’s argument with Hume’s is–ought observation.
Mains angle
- PYQ-style: Why is an accurate description of social practice insufficient to justify it?
- Use the map to diagnose a case, then develop the relevant substantive principle instead of listing every branch.
Flip & recall
Answer in your head first, then tap the card to check.
Practice MCQs
Original Prelims-style questions with explanations.
0 / 3 correct · 3 left
Q1.Which is a meta-ethical question?
Q2.The claim that a common practice must be right most clearly lacks:
Q3.Which relationship is correct?
